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COMMENTS
Maine court has become the first of final impression to make
blood test evidence conclusive. This is not true. Actually we
have the logical next step from the earlier decision, requesting
"believable evidence ''2o that the tests were inaccurate and refus-
ing to subsume the reasons why the jury has not accepted the
"M-N" test results.
Of what probative force is blood evidence in Maine today?
There is no reason to think it has become conclusive to the extent
that a putative father is innocent as a matter of law upon testi-
mony of a serologist to that effect. This may be concluded to
be the present state of the law in Maine: where respondent has
been excluded serologically, the component parts of the evidence
of exclusion become the entire controversy. If, by credible
evidence, doubt is thrown on the skill of the examiners or the
validity of their conclusions, the serological indications of non-
paternity are rejoined by the other evidence and given only such
weight as the jury choose. The further significance of the case
awaits a determination as to what quantum of discrediting evi-
dence the Maine court will require to affirm a verdict of pater-
nity in the face of an apparently conflicting medical fact.
It is doubted whether this is the landmark decision for which
the medico-legal writers have called, i.e., upon testimony of
non-paternity by a blood expert with some sort of official certi-
fication, a directed verdict to that end.21 It is further doubted
whether such a decision soon will be forthcoming in Maine. A
procedure which would so greatly restrict the force of cross-
examination is properly viewed with caution.
DIXON F. SPIVY
PERSONAL PROPERTY-DEPOSIT OF FUNDS IN A BANK TO THE
JOINT CREDIT OF DECEASED DEPOSITOR AND SURVIVING DONEF,-
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AS APPLIED TO DEPOSIT OF FUNDS IN
NAME OF DEPOSITOR AND ANOTHER.-Crandall and defendant
Watts went to the plaintiff bank, signed, executed, and filed with
it an instrument wherein they agreed with each other and with
the bank that all deposits made therein by either of them should
20. Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670, 673 (Me. 1949). Three justices, it mightbe noted, were now sitting who were not present 15 months earlier forJordan v. Davis, note 19 supra.
21. Note, 1 MERcER L. REv 266, 278 (1950) Also see note 4 supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
448 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
be owned by them jointly and with right of survivorship, and
subject to check by either of them. After Crandall's death, the
bank filed a bill of interpleader naming as defendants Watts,
the survivor, and Birlew, the executor of Crandall's estate, each
of whom claimed money in the account established by the de-
ceased in his lifetime. The evidence showed that all deposits
were made by deceased. The passbook remained at all times in
his possession and all checks written against the account, prior
to his death, were written by him. After his death, defendant
Watts on one occasion stated that the money in the account be-
'longed to Crandall. Defendant objected to the introduction of
any parol evidence tending to contradict the terms of the de-
posit agreement. In her appeal she contended that the deposit
agreement was a written contract, the terms of which could not
be varied by parol evidence.
On these facts, the Kansas City Court of Appeals held in
Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts1 that proof of the deposit raised
a presumption that the donee survivor would take absolute title
upon the donor's death, but that the presumption could be over-
come by any competent evidence including parol evidence.2 In
affirming judgment for the executor, the court said that there
was substantial evidence from which the trial court could have
found, as it did, that it was not the intent of either party to the
deposit contract that title to the account, upon Crandall's death,
should vest in the appellant. In support of the decision reliance
was based upon the applicable Missouri statute.3
In jurisdictions having no statute applicable to the rights of a
1. 222 S.W.2d 937 (Mo. App. 1949).
2. A similar rule was announced by the same court in Weber v. Jones,
222 S.W.2d 957 (Mo. App. 1949) decided nine days before the Watts case.3. The applicable statute in Missouri is Mo. RBv. STAT. ANN. §7996(1939), which provides, in part: "When a deposit shall have been made by
any person in the name of such depositor and another person and in form
to be paid to either, or the survivor of them, such deposit thereupon and
any additions thereto made by either of such persons, upon the making
thereof, shall become the property of such persons as joint tenants, and
the same, together with all interest thereon, shall be held for the exclusive
use of the persons so named, and may be paid to either during the lifetime
of both, or to the survivor after the death of one of them, and such payment
and the receipt or acquittance of the one to whom such payment is made
shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge to said bank for all
payments made on account of such deposit in accordance with the terms
thereof." Similar sections from other chapters of the Missouri Code apply
to trust companies (§8070) and building and loan associations (§8257.55).
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surviving joint depositor, the donee has established his interest
on the theory of gift,4 contract,5 or trust.6 However, the cases
frequently reveal an ambiguity of language from which it is diffi-
cult to determine on which of the common law theories the court
is proceeding. If the right of survivorship is expressly provided
by the terms of the deposit agreement, it is generally held that
the prima facie presumption in favor of a gift.7 In many juris-
dictions this holding is strengthened by a statute making a
deposit of money in the names of the owner and another in an
account payable to either or survivor either presumptive 8 or con-
clusive9 evidence of an intention to create a joint tenancy. Even
in those jurisdictions which have a statute it is not always clear
4. The majority of jurisdictions approach the problem of the joint bank
deposit from the analogy of gifts of ordinary chattels. See BROWN, PER-
SONAL PROPERTY §65 (1936).
5. It has been held that the instrument creating the joint account suffi-
ciently imports a consideration to support a valid contract beween the
bank on one hand and the deceased and surviving donee on the other.
McManis v. Keokuk Savings Bank and Trust Co., 239 Iowa 1105, 33 N.W.2d
410, (1948); In re Murdock's Will, 238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W.2d 177 (1947).
Some courts have upheld the transfer by resort to the third party bene-
ficiary analogy, treating the arrangement as a contract between the donor
and the bank, which the donee may enforce, although he has given no con-
sideration. Sullivan v. Hudgins, 303 Mass. 442, 22 N.E.2d 43 (1939);
Rohrbacker v. Citizens Bldg. Ass'n. Co., 40 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio 1941).
6. "There has been considerable puzzlement on the part of the courts
respecting the development of a legalistic formula for upholding the interest
of a survivor in a voluntary joint tenancy account maintained without the
concomitant of a delivery. Some courts, in fact the majority, adopt in the
absence of statute, the theory of a gift where such intent can be shown.
Others sustain the interest of a survivor on the theory of the creation of
a trust. Whichever theory is accepted, the general tendency is to take a
liberal view of the transaction and to devise a way of effectuating the
intent without scrupulous insistence on technical correctitude." Wallace v.
Riley, 23 Cal. App.2d 654, 74 P.2d 807, 810 (1937) (dictum).
7. Commercial Trust Co. v. White, 99 N.J. Eq. 119, 132 Atl. 761 (1926);
McLeod v. Hennepin County Savings Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 176 N.W. 987(1920); Kelley v. Beers, 194 N.Y. 49, 86 N.E. 980 (1909). Contra: Appeal
of Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136 Atl. 459 (1927). BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY§65 (1936).8. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Smith, 320 M. 989, 9 S.W. 2d 58 (1928);
Ball v. Mercantile Trust Co., 220 Mo. App. 1165, 297 S.W. 415 (1927). The
Michigan statute was amended in 1937 to provide, expressly, in accordance
with the previous construction of the Michigan courts, that the making
of a deposit in statutory form should, in the absence of fraud or undue
influence, be "prima facie evidence ... of the intention of such depositors
to vest title to such deposit ... in such survivor or survivors." Frank v.
Schultz, 295 Mich. 714, 295 N.W. 374 (1940). See MICH. Comp. LAWS
c. 487.703 (1948).
9. See CAL. GEN. LAWS, Banks and Banking, Act 652, Art. I, §15a
(Deering, 1944); LAWS OF NEW YORK, Banking Law, §239, sub.3 (Thomp-
son, 1939).
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whether the court is treating the problem as one of gift, contract
or statute.
In 1915 the portion of the section of the Missouri statute
quoted below was copied in haec verba from an identical statute
then in force in New York.'0 This New York law was construed
in Clary v. Fitzgerald,". where it was held that the statutory pre-
sumption was rebuttable. The St. Louis Court of Appeals in
Ball v. Mercaitile Trust Co.12 said that the legislature not only
adopted the statute itself, but also the construction given to it by
the state of its origin. 3 As to the effect of the statute, the court
said:
The statute cited, supra, fixes the interests of the depositors
as those of joint tenants and absent competent testimony of
a contrary intention, it gives to the deposit, in the form
named, the value of raising a presumption of an intent to
make an immediate gift."4
Thus it appears that Missouri adopted the rule of rebuttable pre-
sumption rather than the rule of conclusive presumption which
obtains in some of the jurisdictions either by statute or decision
in this class of cases.
Since the enactment of the statute, Missouri courts have con-
sistently followed the decision in the Catry case.2' In Ball v.
Mercantile Trust Co., supra, it was held that parol evidence is
admissible for the purpose of showing the intent of the donor
even where the deposit is made by a written contract signed by
both the donor and donee, as in the case under discussion.
10. The New York statute was subsequently amended by the addition of
a sentence which does not appeare in Missoumi providing: "The making of
the deposit in such form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence,be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding to which either the
savings bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the intention of bothdepositors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in such
survivor." The statute, as amended, was construed in Moskowitz v. Morrow,
251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506 (1929), to be conclusive of the right of the
survivor to take the balance on hand, at the death of his co-tenant, but onlyin actions to which the survivor or the bank was a party.11. 155 App. Div. 659, 140 N.Y.S. 536 (1913), aff'd without opinion, 213
N.Y. 696, 107 N.E. 1075 (1915).
12. 220 Mo. App. 1165, 297 S.W. 415 (1927).
13. See 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §5209 (3rd ed., Horack,
1943).
14. 220 Mo. App. 1165, 1174, 297 S.W. 415, 418 (1927).15. In Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Du Montimer et at., 193 Mo. App.290, 183 S.W. 1137 (1916), the court said there was no authority in Mis-
souri directly bearing upon the question, but upheld the right of the donee-
survivor on common law principles.
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Similarly, under the statute applying to trust companies,'
extrinsic evidence was considered in an action of interpleader
to determine ownership of a joint deposit after the death of one
of the joint tenants.' 7 Other Missouri cases have affirmed the
rule that the statutory presumption is rebuttable. 8
Appellant in the Watts case relied heavily on Matthew v.
Moncrief.'9 In that case Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme
Court made an exhaustive review of the conflicting decisions
while Associate Justice of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. He said in that opinion that a review of
the decisions convinced the court that "the lack of judicial har-
mony is largely superficial" and "results from a failure to differ-
entiate the decisions factually.20... We think it highly significant
that we could discover no case wherein both parties had signed
an instrument which contained language of joint account and
a survivarship clause where the right of the donee-survivor was
denied."2'
In deciding the Watts case, the Kansas City Court of Appeals
indicated that "it was impressed with the logic" of the Moncrief
16. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §8070 (1939).
17. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Smith, 320 Mo. 989, 9 S.W. 58 (1928).
This case held that the statute announced a rule of evidence and so was
applicable to accounts opened before its enactment.
18. In re Geels Estate, 143 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. App. 1940); Melinek v.
Meier, 124 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1939) ; Schnur v. Dunker, 38 S.W.2d 282
(Mo. App. 1931).
The presumption is said to be a weak one. Armbruster v. Armbruster,
326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W.2d 28 (1930); Mineau v. Boisclair, 323 Mich. 97, 34
N.W.2d 556 (1948). Contra: Link v. Link, 3 N.J. Super. 39, 65 A.2d 89(1949); Greener v. Greener et al., 212 P.2d 194 (Utah 1949). The latter
case requires "clear and convincing" evidence to overcome the presumption
of gift.
It cannot be denied, however, that there is considerable authority in otherjurisdictions contra to the Missouri decisions. No attempt is here made to
review the many conflicting cases, but by way of illustration, attention is
called to the following: Cullani v. Northern Trust Co., 335 Ill. App. 86,
80 N.E.2d 275 (1948) (the deposit card is a contract between the bank and
both despositors and the survivor takes not as donee, but under the contract
negotiated between himself and the bank); In re Juedel's Will, 280 N.Y.
37, 19 N.E.2d 671 (1939) (upon death of one of the depositors in joint
bank account presumption of joint tenancy becomes conclusive in survivor's
favor as to money left in account), and Jorgensen v. Dahlstrom, 53 Cal.
App.2d 322, 127 P.2d 551 (1942) (where the agreement creating the joint
account is unambiguous, parol evidence is inadmissible). It is to be ob-
served that both New York and California have statutes which make the
presumption in favor of the donee conclusive. (See note 8, supra).
19. 135 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
20. Id. at 646.
21. Id. at 648.
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case, but then went on to cite Missouri cases establishing the
view that parol evidence is admissible to rebut the statutory pre-
sumption even under the facts of that case.22
Another factor yet to be considered is the applicability of the
parol evidence rule in this case of cases.23 Appellant in the.Watts
case contended that the deposit agreement constituted a written
contract,2'4 and that therefore the parol evidence rule was appli-
cable. The court takes an indecisive stand on this question and
says:
Whether or not the rule in joint deposit cases should be, or
should continue to be, an exception to the general rule gov-
erning written contracts, is a question that we believe should
be addressed to the Supreme Court, in view of the present
state of the decisions in this state on the subject. 1
It is first to be observed that the parol evidence rule is a rule
of substantive law which, when applicable, defines the limits of
a contract.2r Thus, it is obvious that the parol evidence rule
could not apply except in a jurisdiction where the basis of the
decisions is the finding of a contract in the deposit agreement.
22. Accord, as to holding that presumption in favor of survivor .is rebut-
table: Link v. Link, 3 N.J. Super. 295, 65 A.2d 89 (1949); Greener v.Greener, et a., 212 P.2d 194 (Utah 1949); Mineau v. Boisclair, 323 Mich.
64, 34 N.W.2d 556 (1948) ; In re Lewis' Estate, 194 Miss. 408, 13 So.2d 20(1943) (dictum).
23. As illustrative of cases involving deposits where the depositors signed
statements or agreements, and in which parol evidence was admitted, with-
out evident consideration of the bearing of the parol evidence rule on its
admissibility, see Lester.v. Guenther, 134 N.J. Eq. 53, 33 A.2d 815 (1943);Rauhut v. Reinhart, 22 Del. Ch. 431, 180 Atl. 913 (1935); Bedirian v.
Zorian, 271 Mass. 191, 191 N.E. 448 (1934); In re Reynolds' Estate, 163
N.Y.S. 803 (Surr. Ct. 1916).24. "It is believed that such a theory rests upon a misconception of the
real nature of the question or contest. It must be remembered that the
contest in the cases at hand is between the estate of the original owner and
the survivor (in a few cases the contest is between the owner and his co-depositor). In other words property that admittedly belonged to one person
at a former time is claimed by another who does not pretend to have parted
with any valuable consideration therefor. If the contest were between thedepositors and the bank, it may be true that the depositors, even the one
other than the original owner, could stand on the contractual relation thus
created by the deposit in this form, or that the bank, having paid the fund
to one other than the original owner, might defend an action by the original
owner on the ground that it had complied with its contract in such pay-
ment; but the real contest is not between the depositors and the bank, thebank is a mere stakeholder; the contest is between the depositors them-
selves. In such a case either a gift or a trust is a condition precedent to anyquestion arising under the tenancy created by such a deposit." Note, 1917C. L.R.A. 551. See dissent in Illinois Trust and Savings Co. v. Van Viack,310 Ill. 185, 141 N.E. 546 (1923), for a similar criticism.
25. 222 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Mo. App. 1949).
26. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 631 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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It is apparent from the language of the Ball case and succeed-
ing decisions that the Missouri courts have, with the aid of the
statute, in effect applied the gift theory since in each case it is
the donor's intent which is the subject of inquiry. If the Missouri
cases have been correctly decided on the theory of gift rather
than the theory of contract,27 then it follows that the issue as to
the parol evidence rule in these joint deposit cases is a spurious
one in Missouri.
In the light of this analysis it would seem that the Kansas
City Court of Appeals properly admitted parol evidence in the
Watts case. When a similar case is presented to the Supreme
Court, it is believed that the rule of the Watts case should be
affirmed.; -
RALPH K. SOEBBING
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION-INSTALLATION OF ELEVATORS
IN BUILDING TAXABLE UNDER STATE SALES TAX - EFFECT OF
TITLE RETENTION CLAUSE AND DESIGNATION OF ELEVATORS AS
PERSONAL PROPERTY.-Relator-Otis Elevator Company brought
certiorari against the State Auditor of Missouri in the circuit
court to review the assessment by the auditor of a 2 per cent
sales tax levied under Sections 11407 (b) (g) and 11408 Revised
Statutes of Missouri, on intrastate sales of tangible personal
property. The trial court quashed the Auditor's- finding and he
appealed to the Supreme Court, where in an opinion in Division
2, the trial court's judgment was affirmed in part and reversed
27. "The right of a codepositor to funds deposited by the owner thereof
in an account in the name of the owner and the codepositor, has, in several
states, been upheld on the theory that under the contract between the depos-
itors and the bank, the codepositor is entitled to the deposit on the death
of the original owner of the funds deposited. It seems clear, however, that
in such case there must be an intention on the part of the original owner
of the funds to make a gift to the other joint depositor. Even assuming the
existence of a third party beneficiary contract, the depositor other than the
one originally owning the money is the donee of a property interest.
"The contract may supply the formalities necessary to render a gift
effective. And it may be evidence of intent to make a gift. But it cannot
in reason conclusively show an intent to make a gift so as to preclude
showing that the deposit was made in this form for some other purpose."
7 AM. JUR. BANKS §436.
28. The Missouri Supreme Court in Gordon v. Erickson et al., 356 Mo.
272, 201 S.W.2d 404 (1947) held that the evidence was insufficient to
defeat the survivor's rights, but is it clearly implied that evidence is
admissible to show the donor's true intent. The statute apparently was
not considered.
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